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“To cut the Gordian knot of multimodal transport what seems to be needed is 
less the trusty sword of Cervantes than the Subtle Knife of Philip Pullman, as well 
as the wisdom of Solomon.” 
 
 
Clarke, M "A conflict of conventions: The UNCITRAL / CMI draft transport instrument on 
your doorstep" (2003) 9 The Journal of International Maritime Law 39.
Content 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………. 1 
Defining international multimodal transport……………………………………….. 2 
Background to multimodal transport………………………………………………... 5 
Problems facing multimodal transport……………………………………………… 6 
Disharmony of existing legal regimes for unimodal forms of transport……….. 7 
Localisation of damage……………………………………………………………. 8 
Recovery actions by multimodal transport operators…………………………... 9 
Multimodal transport documents as documents of title………………………… 10 
Confusing agents and principals………………………………………………….. 12 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………... 14 
Theoretical models for a uniform regime…………………………………………… 14 
The Multimodal Convention…………………………………………………………… 18 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….. 18 
Theoretical model: network or uniform system..………………………………… 19 
Clash between the Multimodal Convention and the Hague-Visby Rules…….. 21 
Basis of liability……………………………………………………………………... 24 
Limits of liability…………………………………………………………………….. 25 
Relationship with other conventions……………………………………………… 26 
Confusing agents and principals………………………………………………….. 28 
The Multimodal Convention and third parties…………………………………… 29 
The failings and successes of the Multimodal Convention…………………….. 30 
The Draft Instrument……………………………………………………………………. 31 
Introduction………………………………………………………………………….. 31 
Theoretical model: network or uniform system………………………………….. 35 
Basis of liability……………………………………………………………………... 38 
Clash between the Multimodal Convention and the CMR……………………... 39 
Limits of liability…………………………………………………………………….. 42 
The position of third parties and subcontractors under the Draft Instrument… 44 
The failings and successes of the Draft Instrument…………………………….. 47 
Abandon or persevere with the Draft Instrument?………………………………... 53 
Starting again....…………………………………………………………………………. 58 
Identifying fundamental issues……………………………………………………. 58 
Comparing bases of liability……………………………………………………….. 59 










“The multimodal transport industry is inherently complicated.” 
Chris Hilton1
 
The legal problems faced by multimodal transport are as old as modern transport 
itself.2 The first attempts made at solving these problems can be traced back to 
1913. To date, however, all attempts at producing a convention, or set of rules, to 
bring uniformity to multimodal transport have failed.3  The main reason for these 
continuing failures is captured in the above quote; multimodal transport is 
complicated, very complicated. 
 
The Draft Instrument on Carriage of Goods by Sea, 11 December 2001, (“the 
Draft Instrument”), which took three and a half years to draft4 and has now been 
under consideration for a further four years5, is the latest torch bearer of hope for 
the multimodal transport industry. The Draft Instrument has, however, been 
poorly received by the legal fraternity and it’s flame also seems destined to be 
snuffed out. 
 
This thesis provides a short background to multimodal transport and an overview 
of the problems currently facing the industry. The accepted models for a solution 
are considered and an analysis is then conducted of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the two recent attempts at producing a uniform legal regime for 
                                                 
1 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems  40. 
2 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 147. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Document titled "Draft instrument on carriage of goods [wholly or partly][by sea]", page 2, accessed on 
the website of the Comite Maritime International (Author's details not provided): 
<http://www.comitemaritime.org/draft/draft.html, accessed on 21 February 2005. 
5 Tetley, W "Reform of Carriage of Goods – The Uncitral Draft and Senate COGSA '99" (2003) 28 Tulane 
Maritime Law Journal  16. 
 2
multimodal transport namely; the Draft Instrument and The United Nations 
Convention On International Multimodal Transport Of Goods, 1980 (“the 
Multimodal Convention”). 
 
As neither of these attempts appear to be a tenable solution, I then examine 
whether the quest for uniformity should be abandoned or, if the process were to 
begin again, what lessons can be learned from the failures of these attempts.  
 
“All things are wearisome….what has been done is what will be, and what 
has been done is what will be done, there is nothing new under the sun.” 
Ecclesiastes 1:8-9  
 
Professor Malcolm Clarke refers to this philosophical verse when lamenting that 
the drive for a uniform multimodal transport regime seems to have succumbed to 
a large degree of drafting fatigue.6 There appear to be no new solutions to the 
problems faced and, despite years of effort, a final solution is not yet tangible. 
 
Despite this, I believe I have proposed some original ideas that may, in the 
future, interest drafters charged with finding a new solution. 
 
Defining international multimodal transport 
 
What is international multimodal transport? Some definitions of prevalent terms in 
international multimodal transport are provided in the Multimodal Convention. 
This convention, which is discussed in greater depth later, was prepared under  
                                                 
6 Clarke, M "A conflict of conventions: The UNCITRAL / CMI draft transport instrument on your 
doorstep" (2003) 9 The Journal of International Maritime Law 29. 
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the auspices of the United Nations’ Commission on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”) in an effort to bring uniformity to the legal problems facing 
multimodal transport.7  The definitions are, therefore, a helpful guide to 
understanding multimodal transport. 
 
“International Multimodal Transport” is defined as: 
 
“... the carriage of goods by at least two different modes of transport on the 
basis of a mulitmodal transport contract from a place in one country at which 
the goods are taken in charge by the mulitmodal transport operator to a place 
designated for delivery situated in a different country, the operations of pick-
up and delivery of goods carried out in the perfomance of a unimodal 
transport contract, as defined in such contract, shall not be considered as 
international multimodal transport.”8
 
There are four recognised modes of transport for the carriage of goods; carriage 
by sea, rail, road or air. Each of these modes are referred to singularly as a form 
of “unimodal” transport. The above definition recognises international multimodal 
transport utilising at least two forms of unimodal transport for the carriage of 
goods from one country to another.   
 
An example could be the transport of fruit from South Africa to the United 
Kingdom. The goods could transported from the South African interior to a port 
by rail, by ship from the South African port to a port in the United Kingdom and 
then by road transport to a distribution point in the British interior. 
 
                                                 
7 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 147 and 164. 
8 Article 1(1) of the Multimodal Convention. 
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A “Multimodal transport contract” means: 
 
“… a contract whereby a multimodal transport operator undertakes, 
against payment of freight, to perform or to procure the performance of 
international multimodal transport.”9
 
In the above example, a multimodal transport contract would be the single 
contract entered into between the shipper and the receiver for the transport of 
fruit from the South African interior to the British interior. The terms of the 
contract would regulate the relationship between the parties for all the “unimodal” 
modes of transport used in the transport operation.  
 
A “Multimodal transport operator” is defined as: 
 
“…any person who on his own behalf or through another person acting on his 
behalf concludes a multimodal transport contract and who acts as a principal, 
not as an agent or on behalf of the consignor or of the carriers participating in 
the multimodal transport operations, and who assumes responsibility for the 
performance of  the contract.”10
 
This definition needs some clarification. It envisages a multimodal transport 
operator, or carrier, accepting responsibility for the whole carriage of a 
consignment of goods from the moment the goods are taken over from the 
consignor until they are delivered to the consignee, even though the goods will 
be transported by different modes of carriage. Although the carrier may not 
personally perform each leg of carriage, but rather sub-contract certain legs of 
                                                 
9 Article 1(3) of the Multimodal Convention. 
10 Article 1(2) of the Multimodal Convention. 
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the carriage to other specialised transport operators, the carrier will still be liable 
to the consignor or consignee for the whole operation in terms of the multimodal 
transport contract.11
 
Background to multimodal transport 
 
In the 1960’s the development of containers and the standardisation of container 
sizes revolutionised the transport of goods by reducing turn around times in ports 
of loading and discharge. The subsequent incorporation of these standardised 
units into other modes of transport facilitated the seamless handling of cargo 
between sea, rail and road transport.12
 
The ever-increasing demand for speed and efficiency in the delivery and 
transport of goods has lead to continual capital investment being made by 
participants in the multimodal transport industry. This has, in turn, lead to 
continual improvements in the technological and managerial aspects of 
multimodal transport.13
 
On the technological side, automated container handling has become so 
sophisticated that some terminals now have driverless stacking cranes and 
vehicles guided by computers. The design of deep-sea container vessels is also 
continually improving. Cell guides and hatchless vessels obviate the need for the 
time consuming job of lashing.14 The capacities and speed of loading for deep-
sea container vessels is also constantly increasing.  
 
                                                 
11 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 3. 
12Hare, J Shipping Law & Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 464 – 465. 
13 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 1. 
14 Faber, D “The problems arising out of multimodal transport” [1996] LMCLQ 504. 
 6
On the managerial side, large multimodal transport operators have expanded 
their operations to an extent that they now operate or control ships, railways and 
road transportation themselves. Some have specialised in understanding the 
logistics of producing manufactured goods, warehousing them and releasing 
them to the market so that consumer demand is effectively satisfied, whilst 
ensuring that warehousing, production and transport costs are kept to an 
effective minimum. Multimodal transport operators refer to this as a “just in time” 
service which they are able to offer their clients.15  
 
Electronic communications have also assisted the logistics of transportation, the 
numbers and locations of containers can be continuously tracked and some 
transport operators use electronic communications to expedite booking of goods, 
create contracts of carriage and produce loading lists. In some countries customs 
declarations can now be made electronically.16
 
The net result of these continuing developments is a more effective industry 
whose customers are better served. Another result has been the development of 
the widespread need for a single multimodal contract to govern the carriage of a 
single consignment of goods through various modes of transport. 
 
Problems facing multimodal transport 
 
The development of the law in the area of multimodal transport has not kept pace 
with the practical and technological developments, the result has been confusion 
over the legal rights of parties to a transport contract when damage occurs to the 
goods being transported.17 The main problem areas are discussed below. 
                                                 
15 Faber, D “The problems arising out of multimodal transport” [1996] LMCLQ 504. 
16 Ibid 505. 
17 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 1. 
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Disharmony of existing legal regimes for unimodal forms of transport 
 
The fundamental problem that has been brought to the fore is the inability of the 
law to successfully harmonise the differing legal regimes that are already in 
existence for unimodal methods of transport.18
 
The six major legal regimes for the differing forms of unimodal transport include; 
the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules and the Hamburg Rules which apply to 
the carriage of goods by sea; the Convention For The International Carriage Of 
Goods By Road (“CMR”) (the abbreviation is based on the French title); the 
Convention For The International Carriage By Rail (“COTIF”) (this abbreviation is 
also based on the French title) and the Warsaw System for carriage by air. These 
conventions will be examined in greater depth later.  
 
The conventions contain different provisions on important issues including; the 
basis and determination of liability (which includes defences available to a 
carrier), the calculation of monetary limits of liability, the burden of proof upon 
claimants and the time limits within which claims must be made.  
 
Even though parties to a transport contract may wish to contract on agreed 
terms, this freedom will be impaired by unimodal conventions which may have 
mandatory application if damage to goods occurs during a unimodal leg of a 
multimodal transport contract. The intervention of the provisions of a unimodal 
regime may alternately favour or prejudice cargo interests depending on which 
regime is applicable in the specific circumstances.  
 
                                                 
18De Wit, R Multimodal Transport  7. 
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The problems facing cargo interests are compounded as it is often very difficult to 
determine whether a specific unimodal regime will be applicable.  
 
(Please note that I have used the term “cargo interests” to refer to the seller, the 
buyer and the insurers. When goods are lost or destroyed the buyer or seller will, 
depending on who was bearing the risk, look to their insurers, who upon 
recompensing the loss will consider recovering from the party responsible for the 
damage.) 
 
The amounts of compensation which cargo interests will be entitled to receive, 
the time periods for giving notice of a claim and the basis of liability are, 
therefore, dependant on the stage of transport where the damage occurs and the 
corresponding applicable convention.19 The unimodal conventions may also 
provide for forums for the hearing of disputes that parties would not otherwise 
have agreed to had they had freedom to contract on their own terms. 
 
The result for cargo interests is that they cannot contract on predictable terms as 
it is impossible to predict on which leg of multimodal transport damage may 
occur. Even when the localisation of damage can be confirmed, there is generally 
further confusion over whether the legal regime applicable to that unimodal form 
of transport will apply.20  
 
Localisation of damage 
 
A quandary is presented when there is difficulty in determining where in the 
transport chain the damage actually occurred. As goods are frequently moved in 
                                                 
19Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 16. 
20Ibid 7- 8. 
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containers it can be virtually impossible to determine where the damage took 
place. This confusion can result in cargo interests having to protect their claim by 
issuing suit against all the parties involved in the transport until the actual cause 
of damage is finally determined. 
 
This difficulty is greatest for multimodal transport operators who assume 
responsibility for goods for the entire multimodal transport operation. If damage 
occurs, cargo interests will be able to recover from the multimodal transport 
operator or the multimodal transport operator’s third party insurers leaving the 
headache of determining where the damage occurred for the purposes of 
recovery with the multimodal transport operators or their insurers. 
 
Recovery actions by multimodal transport operators 
 
Even if the multimodal transport operator is able to determine the locality of the 
damage there may be other legal impediments to recovery as demonstrated in 
Transcontainer Express Ltd. v  Custodian Security Ltd.21 In this matter the 
multimodal transport operator, Transcontainer, had to pay compensation to cargo 
interests for their loss and was unable to recover the compensation amount from 
the sub-contractor actually responsible for the loss.  
 
Transcontainer had subcontracted a road carriage leg to a road haulage 
operator, Crossland, who left a trailer load of goods at the premises of Custodian, 
who provided a security service, for safe keeping, the goods had been stolen 
from Custodian’s premises.  
 
                                                 
21 [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 128. 
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Transcontainer were unable to sue Custodian in contract and relied upon their 
delictual rights. Under English law, Transcontainer had to prove that they had 
“possessory title” to the goods. Their limited contractual rights to the property and 
the fact that they had to recompense cargo interests were not sufficient to 
establish this. If Transcontainer had been able to prove that Crossland were their 
agents they would have succeeded in their claim but they were unable to prove 
this. 
 
Transcontainer were precluded from raising a new argument at the appeal court 
stage that, under the contract with Crossland, they could have taken possession 
of the goods at any time, which may have lead to success in the action. 
 
Although this quagmire could have been avoided through tighter contractual 
drafting and different argument before the court, what is illustrated by this case is 
the complexities faced by a multimodal transport operator and the prejudices that 
a multimodal transport operator may suffer where the law is not flexible enough 
to protect their interests. 
 
Multimodal transport documents as documents of title 
 
Bills of lading have long since been recognised as documents of title, giving the 
holder thereof the rights to possession of the goods stated therein. This 
acceptance has facilitated payments between shippers and receivers banks who 
rely on documents of title as pledges to provide security for credit given to the 
customer. The documentation produced when goods are transported by 
multimodal transport is, however, not as widely recognised. 
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A receipt for goods to be transported by multimodal transport does not have the 
same characteristics as a normal bill of lading. Firstly, the goods are not 
necessarily “shipped” and may only be indicated as “received for shipment”. 
Furthermore the goods indicated on a multimodal transport document may be 
subject to transshipment down the transport chain which means that the 
document does not lend itself to security purposes if the responsibility for the 
goods is to be subcontracted. 
 
The international banking community has however recognised the growing 
utilisation of multimodal transport documents in international trade and has 
developed its own rules to govern the acceptance of multimodal transport 
documents as documents of title.22  Article 26 of the ICC Uniform Customs And 
Practice For Documentary Credits (“UCP500”) sets down certain requirements 
allowing for the acceptance of multimodal transport documentation provided the 
single document covers the entire transportation of the goods and the carrier 
assumes responsibility for all legs of transport.23
 
The acceptance of multimodal transport documents to facilitate payments 
between banks has not, however, developed through any recognition attributed 
by law but rather through customary banking practice developed out of the 
necessity to facilitate international trade. It remains for an adopted convention to 
formally recognise the validity of multimodal transport documents as documents 
of title.24
 
The status of multimodal transport documents as documents of title is also 
important to determine who has title to sue. Different conventions apply different 
rules for the passing of risk and title to sue. 
                                                 
22 Proctor, C The legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal Transport Document 114. 
23 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 17. 
24 Proctor, C op cit 115. 
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For traditional bills of lading the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 
1992, is recognised as one of the simpler systems regarding title to sue, it 
separates the issue of title to sue from the passing of property in goods and 
provides that “the lawful holder” of a bill of lading has rights of suit.25 Other 
systems are not so simple. Article 13 of the CMR provides that the consignee will 
only have title to sue in cases of loss and English law is recognised as having a 
complex doctrine of title to sue.  
 
The obvious difficulty for multimodal transport is that there is not a developed 
body of jurisprudence regulating title to sue for multimodal transport 
documentation. 
 
Confusing agents and principals 
 
The freight forwarder has traditionally played an integral role in the transport of 
goods. The services provided by freight forwarders have included; agency, 
organising cargo insurance, handling export and import documentation and 
advice to clients on transport and distribution.26
 
Containerisation has however provided opportunities for freight forwarders to 
expand their services and some now receive recognition as majors players in the 
transport industry as they are able to act as multimodal transport operators by 
assuming responsibility for the multimodal transport of goods. They are able to 
do this even though they do not own infrastructure of their own, most of the 
duties are subcontracted to other carriers.27  The term “non-vessel operating 
common carrier” has been coined to describe their operations. In practice, 
                                                 
25 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 15. 
26 Ibid 21. 
27 Proctor, C The legal Role of the Bill of Lading, Sea Waybill and Multimodal Transport Document  99. 
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however, the failure of parties to ensure that they are contracting with freight 
forwarders or multimodal transport operators as principal and not as agent for 
other carriers is cause for many problems. 
 
It can be difficult to determine whether a party has assumed liability as an agent 
or as a principal. The effect is that cargo interests may be uncertain who to 
institute action against. In addition, there is the risk that a multimodal transport 
operator may have contracted, as agent, with a party of poor financial standing 
rendering suit ineffective. 
 
Furthermore, where a multimodal transport operator acts as agent, the cargo 
interests will not be able to control the terms and conditions they will find 
themselves bound by for any potential actions against the carriers their agents 
have contracted with. Cargo interests may be precluded from suing in contract 
and may have to rely on their delictual remedies, which may present difficulties 
that could otherwise have been avoided.28
 
A consignor needs to take care when entering into a through transport contract 
as opposed to a combined transport contract with a multimodal transport operator 
or a freight forwarder.  The danger of the former is that the multimodal transport 
operator may act as an agent on behalf of the consignor when entering into 
transport by differing modes, although the multimodal transport operator may 
assume responsibility when the goods are in own care.29  In terms of the latter, 
the multimodal transport operator assumes responsibility for care of the goods for 
the entire transportation of the goods. 
 
                                                 
28 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 10. 




The result of all these difficulties is confusion. Confusion over which legal regime 
is applicable, who the contracting parties are, what contractual terms are 
applicable and which time bar period is applicable. This causes time delays and 
unnecessary expenditure on lawyers who may have to issue multiple legal suits 
against various potential defendants in order to protect the cargo interests’ rights. 
These legal problems drain the industry of funds that could rather be invested in 
the industry itself.30
 
Theoretical models for a uniform regime 
 
A uniform regime refers to a single set of rules which would govern a multimodal 
transport contract. There are two main theoretical models for a uniform legal 
regime. The first model is referred to as the “network system” or “chameleon 
system”, the second is the “uniform system”.31 A “modified network system”, 
being a hybrid of the network system, has also been considered. 
 
The network system essentially “knits” the different legal regimes for unimodal 
carriage together so that when damage occurs during one of the modes of 
carriage the unimodal rules specific to that form of carriage will apply to resolving 
disputes over damage to cargo between cargo interests and multimodal transport 
operators. In the network system no consistent set of rules applies, it is merely a 
meshing of the different regimes. The multimodal transport operator and the 
cargo interests must resolve their disputes according to the applicable regime. 
Under the uniform system, a multimodal transport operator and a shipper would 
                                                 
30 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 2. 
31 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport  138. 
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contract to the application of the same set of rules for determining liability 
regardless of the form of transport being used when damage occurs.32
 
Under the network system the obvious question which stands out is; what will 
happen when the localisation of damage cannot be determined? What rules will 
apply? There appear to be no easy answers to these questions. 
 
The network system also has potential liability gaps. Where damage occurs to 
cargo which is in storage between two transport legs there may not be a 
transport regime governing such storage resulting in a “liability gap”. The network 
system does not overcome problems faced by conflicts between a “network” 
based carriage contract and national laws. The choice of law and jurisdiction 
forums contained in carriage contracts may also conflict with the specific 
unimodal regimes.33 It is argued that these issues create the greatest problem for 
the network system, which is its lack of predictability.34
 
“The pure network system of liability presents enormous problems and 
disadvantages to the extent that in many situations it is practically 
impossible to apply with any reasonable result.” 
Ralph De Wit35  
 
Ralph De Wit has dubbed the network system as “unworkable”36, this conclusion 
and the above quote cast a melancholic view on the network system. In short, it 
is hard to see how a network system could solve any of the problems already 
faced by multimodal transport. It does not change the conflicting regimes which 
                                                 
32 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport  139 and 143. 
33 Ibid 142. 
34 Ibid 140. 
35 Ibid 139. 
36 Ibid 513. 
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multimodal transport operators have to face, in fact, it seems that even more 
problems are caused where the regimes are interfaced or knitted together. 
 
A modified network system may solve some of the problems. This entails 
inserting provisions to cover the problem areas of non-localisation and liability 
gaps, there would still be difficulty regarding potentially conflicting laws. Even if 
the localisation problems could be solved there would still, therefore, be an 
unpredictability about which legal regime, and thus limits, were going to apply in 
case of damage.37  
 
It is suggested that the uniform system is the ideal system.38 Here the shipper 
and multimodal transport operator would enter into a contract where the liability 
of the multimodal transport operator is certain regardless of the form of transport 
used. A shipper would be able to hold the multimodal transport operator liable for 
damage on the agreed terms no matter where the damage occurred.  
 
The system solves the problem of localisation faced by cargo interests, however, 
what it effectively does is shift the unpredictability onto the multimodal transport 
operator who will be left considering his recourse actions after compensating the 
shipper or cargo interests for their loss. Hopefully some of the unpredictability 
caused by differing legal regimes will be reduced for multimodal transport 
operators if a number of countries adopt a uniform system and apply it ahead of 




                                                 
37 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 143. 
38 Ibid. 
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The effect of this shift in risk from shippers or cargo interests to multimodal 
transport operators would result in lower cargo insurance premiums for cargo 
interests and an increase in liability insurance for multimodal transport operators. 
It has, however, been argued that the relative size of the increase faced by 
multimodal transport operator’s would be smaller than the size of the decrease in 
cargo insurance for cargo interests.39  The general view is that the increase in 
premiums for multimodal transport operators would be bearable.40  This still 
needs to be conclusively confirmed by risk analysts. 
 
Practically, the effects of the uniform system would therefore be certainty for 
cargo interests, as opposed to uncertainty for both cargo interests and 
multimodal transport operators. It would also mean an overall decrease in the 
amount of insurance premiums paid by cargo interests and multimodal transport 
operators collectively, despite the increase in premiums for multimodal transport 
operators. 
 
The industry gain, being the collective decrease in insurance premiums, would 
probably be nullified by the introduction of increased transport rates by 
multimodal transport operators. The net effect of a uniform system may, 
therefore, only be certainty for cargo interests. This is, nevertheless, a better 
option than the network system. 
 
De Wit believes that the allocation of risk in carriage is not that important but the 
predictability must be. This is the advantage afforded to cargo interests under a 
uniform system which can never be fulfilled under a network system.41
 
                                                 
39 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 145. 
40 Ibid 430. 
 
41 Ibid 513. 
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Although it has been argued that the introduction of a regime based on the 
uniform system would cause some discrepancies as it would initially run 
concurrently with unimodal regimes, it is suggested that if it is well drafted, this 
problem may be overcome and it may be the first step towards a “famous 
universal transport convention that has been a lawyers dream for such a long 
time”.42  
 
There have been numerous failed attempts at producing a uniform legal regime 
,which date back to 1913, these previous attempts can all be analysed against 
the models discussed above. I will now consider the strengths and weaknesses 
of the two recent attempts namely; the Multimodal Convention and the Draft 
Instrument, and the models on which they were based namely. 
 




The Multimodal Convention was designed, under the auspices of the United 
Nations’ Commission on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), to regulate all 
contracts of international multimodal transport. Various provisions of the 
Hamburg Rules were drawn on, especially the “basis of liability” provisions for 
determining the responsibility of the carrier and the onus of proof to be bourne by 
a claimant.43  
 
At the time of drafting it was felt that the Hamburg Rules would be an ideal basis 
for the Multimodal Convention as the Hamburg Rules had been developed to 
                                                 
42 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport  146. 
43Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems  52. 
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replace the complicated and intricate liability pattern of the Hague Visby Rules 
and had effectively bought shipping law closer to the regimes for land-based 
carriage.44  It was anticipated that the Hamburg Rules would not take long to be 
come into force, thus encouraging the ratification and adoption of the Multimodal 
Convention.45 The Hamburg Rules were, however, not received as well as 
anticipated.  Due to its failings, there have been insufficient signatories for its 
ratification and it has never come into force. 
 
Theoretical model: network or uniform system 
 
The Multimodal Convention was said to have adopted the “uniform” system as 
opposed to a “network” system.46 It has, however, retained features of the 
network system where damage is localised. Article 19 of the Convention 
essentially creates this network system, it states: 
 
“When the loss of or damage to the goods occurred during one particular 
stage of the multimodal transport, in respect of which an applicable 
international convention or mandatory national law provides a higher limit of 
liability than that which would follow from the application of paragraphs 1 to 3 
of article 18, then the multimodal transport operator’s liability for such loss or 
damage shall be determined by reference to the provisions of such 
convention or mandatory national law.” 
 
Consequently, if the loss is localised, liability will be governed by any applicable 
international convention or national law containing higher limits of liability than 
those set out in the Multimodal Convention.47 This is not reflective of a “uniform” 
                                                 
44 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 165. 
45 Ibid. 
46  Faber, D “The problems arising out of multimodal transport” [1996] LMCLQ 507. 
47 Faber, D and other contributors Practical Guides: Multimodal Transport-Avoiding Legal Problems 58. 
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system, the Convention is better described as "modified network" system.  It is 
argued that the minimum requirements for a convention are not met as a 
predictable limit of liability cannot be determined.48 To compound matters the 
methods set out in the convention for determining limits of liability when the 
damage is non-localised are quite complex.49
 
The network system for localised loss created by Article 19 raises further 
problems. There is confusion over what system of law will be used to determine 
whether an international convention or mandatory national law is applicable in the 
first place. It could be the law of the contract, the law of the place where the 
dispute is decided or the law of the particular stage where the damage 
occurred.50 It is also possible that an international convention or mandatory 
national law may not apply where the carriage is by two or more modes of 
transport.51
 
The Multimodal Convention does not prevent contracting states from introducing 
local laws setting limits of liability higher than those contained in the Convention, 
effectively making the Convention useless where damage is localised. This 
destroys the uniformity intended by the Convention.52
 
Disappointingly, even though the Convention creates a minimum level of liability, 
the unpredictability of which legal regime will be applied where damage is 
localised remains.53
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Clash between the Multimodal Convention and the Hague-Visby Rules 
 
As referred to above there will be a difficulty in determining whether an applicable 
international convention or mandatory national law applies to a dispute arising 
under a multimodal contract, which would have to be done before considering 
whether the limits of another regime are higher than those set out in the 
Multimodal Convention.54
 
To demonstrate some of the difficulties that may arise an analysis is conducted 
below on the applicability of the Hague-Visby Rules in circumstances where the 
Multimodal Convention may also be applicable. The Hague-Visby Rules are a 
good example to use as it is a regime that has been adopted by many of the 
major sea-faring nations. 
  
To determine whether the Rules would apply to a contract concluded with a 
multimodal carrier who may be utilizing more than one mode of transport one 
would have to consider, firstly, whether one of the parties satisfy the Rules’ 
definition of a carrier. Secondly, whether a multimodal transport document 
constitutes a contract of carriage and thirdly whether it is a bill of lading or similar 
document of title.55  
 
Article 1(a) of the Hague-Visby Rules define a “carrier” as: 
““Carrier” includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of 
carriage with a shipper.” 
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It is suggested that the use of the word “includes” in the above definition does not 
limit a carrier to being an owner or charterer and will be wide enough to apply to 
a multimodal transport operator who neither owns nor charters vessels but 
accepts responsibility for the carriage of goods.56
 
Secondly, Article 1(b) of the Hague-Visby Rules defines a “contract of carriage” 
as: 
 
“ …applying only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of lading or any 
other similar document of title, in so far as such document relates to the 
carriage of goods by sea, including any bill of lading or any similar 
document as aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a charter party from 
the moment at which such bill of lading or similar document of title 
regulates the relations between a carrier and a holder of same.” 
 
Two reported cases have suggested that the Rules may not be applicable to 
multimodal transport contracts. In A. Gagniere & Co. v. The Eastern Company of 
Warehouses57 freight forwarders issued a document, in the form of a house bill of 
lading, evidencing a promise to arrange for the forwarding of the goods between 
the shippers and the carriers of the goods. The forwarders were held not to be 
liable on the contract for the loss of the goods. The judge held that, despite the 
form of the bill, it was not an undertaking of an absolute character to carry the 
goods anywhere. 
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Similarly, in The Cape Comorin58 it was held that a “house bill of lading” issued 
by a freight forwarder as agent was at most a receipt with authority to enter into 
carriage on behalf of a shipper.  
 
These cases show that that it is necessary for a party to assume some liability for 
the transportation in order for the contract to amount to a contract of carriage. It is 
suggested that the same principles should be applied in determining the 
applicability of the Hague-Visby Rules to multimodal transport contracts.59 If this 
requirement were met, the Rules would apply to multimodal contracts. This 
reiterates the need to ensure that the capacity and role of parties entering into a 
multimodal contract are carefully considered.  
 
Thirdly, in terms of Article 1(b) of the Rules, stated above, a contract is required 
to be “covered by a bill of lading or any similar document of title, in so far as such 
document relates to the carriage of goods by sea.”  
 
This requirement questions whether a multimodal transport document, which 
includes transport both ashore and at sea, would be prevented from being 
termed a bill of lading or similar document of title.60 In Pyrene Co. v Scindia 
Navigation Co61 the court held that where a single contract covers both inland 
and sea carriage, the only part which falls within the Rules is that which relates to 
the carriage of goods by sea, which means that the Rules would apply to 
contracts for multimodal transport which cover both sea and inland carriage.62
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It would still be necessary, however, to determine whether a multimodal transport 
contract qualifies as a bill of lading or similar document of title. There is no clear 
case law deciding this issue and doubt remains whether a multimodal transport 
document would qualify as bill of lading or similar document of title. This may 
have been a very complicated issue had the Multimodal Convention been 
adopted.63 The best basis for the recognition of multimodal transport documents 
remains that afforded by traders and the banking community in the ordinary 
course of their business, but formal legal recognition would still be welcomed. 
 
Basis of liability 
 
The system that the Hamburg Rules uses to determine liability is referred to as 
the negligence theory. This presumes that when goods are damaged whilst 
under the responsibility of a carrier the damage was caused by the carriers 
negligence, unless he is able to disprove such negligence.64 It is a system 
presuming negligence whilst allowing for a reverse onus of proof.  
 
The negligence system has been hailed as an ideal system for determining 
liability of a carrier when damage occurs.65 The advantages of the negligence 
system are discussed in depth later, however, the adoption of the negligence 
system in the Hamburg Rules was felt to be a vast improvement on the 
complicated system of liability under the Hague-Visby Rules and brought the law 
for carriage of liability at sea more in line with systems for liability applied under 
other unimodal forms of carriage.66
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The provisions for liability under the Hamburg Rules were thus restated in the 
Multimodal Convention, under Article 16, and was heralded as one of the major 
successes of the Multimodal Convention. Article 16 states:  
 
“The multimodal transport operator shall be liable for loss resulting from 
loss or damage to the goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the 
occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay in delivery took place 
while the goods were in his charge as defined in article 14, unless the 
multimodal transport operator proves that he, his servants or agents or 
any other person referred to in article 15 took all measures that could 
reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.” 
 
Limits of liability 
 
The provisions limiting the actual amount of liability, which are set out in Article 
18 of the Convention, have been described as “difficult, unsatisfactory and 
somewhat complex.67 These limits will apply where an international convention or 
mandatory international law does not. 
 
Calculations for limiting liability differ depending on whether damage occurred in 
transit which included a sea leg or not. The basis upon which it is decided that a 
transportation operation has a sea leg or not is not clear and may lead to various 
disputes. Article 19 also contains awkward calculations for limiting liability for 
delay.68
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The multimodal transport operator will lose the right to limit liability if it can be 
proven that the he acted recklessly or with intent to cause damage. 
 
Relationship with other conventions 
 
The convention faces difficulty where states elect not to accede and wish to apply 
their own conventions. This would come to the fore where the loss is localised in 
a specific state and a claimant would prefer to sue in that state because the 
applicable local convention provides more favourable terms to the claimant.   
 
The Multimodal Convention attempts to solve the difficulty which would arise 
where two different regimes may appear applicable to a certain scenario and has 
created Article 38, it provides: 
 
“If according to articles 26 or 27, judicial or arbitral proceedings are brought in 
a Contracting State in a case relating to international multimodal transport 
transport subject to this Convention which takes place between two States of 
which only one is a Contracting State, and if both these States are at the time 
of entry into force of this Convention equally bound by another international 
convention, the court or arbitral tribunal may, in accordance with obligations 
under such convention, give effect to the provisons thereof.” 
 
An example of its application would be a where there is transit between a place in 
State A and a place in State B but the dispute is to be resolved in State C, then if 
States A and C are contracting States to the Multimodal Convention and have 
given effect to the Convention in their domestic law, but State B is not a 
contracting state to the Multimodal Convention, a court or arbitrator in State C 
“may” give effect to any rules appearing in an international convention to which 
 27
both State A and State B are contracting parties.69 This provision has been 
modelled on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969.70
 
Not only is the provision complicated, it is also not exhaustive and leaves open a 
considerable area of potential conflict where no rules apply to prioritise one 
convention ahead of another. Furthermore, it is left to the court or arbitrator to 
resolve the conflict, who will have a discretion to do so.71 This leaves a problem 
for cargo interests in anticipating how it would be applied in practice. Cargo 
interests would not be able to assess the extent of their legal rights and 
obligations and considerable uncertainty would remain, not only at the time of 
entering into a multimodal contract, but even after a dispute has arisen.72
 
The drafters of the Multimodal Convention have also bourne in mind the 
popularity of the CMR , particularly in Europe, and have drafted Article 30, 
paragraph 4, to provide that the Multimodal Convention shall not apply to 
circumstances where an incident would be regulated by the terms of the CMR.  
 
Although the provision may seem simple, it brings further headaches as the 
interface between road transport and sea transport is slightly blurred by the roll 
on roll off nature of road haulage. A road carrier or truck may, itself, be carried on 
board a ship for certain legs of the multimodal transport operation, making it 
difficult to determine whether the CMR or Multimodal Convention applies.73 The 
uncertainty faced by cargo interests is, therefore, perpetuated. 
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Confusing agents and principals 
 
As discussed previously, Article 1, paragraph 3, of the Multimodal Convention 
states: 
 
“Multimodal transport contract” means a contract whereby a multimodal 
operator undertakes, against payment of freight, to perform or to procure 
the performance of international multimodal transport.” 
 
The resultant interpretation thereof, insofar as it is applicable to a multimodal 
transport operator, is that there must be a voluntary contractual assumption of 
liability by the multimodal transport operator before the mandatory rules apply, 
the carrier must, therefore, “contract in” to the multimodal transport 
arrangements.74  It is argued that this does not alleviate any of the problems 
experienced by cargo interests who must still determine whether they contracted 
with a freight forwarder as agent or principal.75  
 
The Multimodal Convention does not solve this problem and shippers will have to 
resolve it practically by obtaining clarity on whether they are contracting with a 
purported multimodal transport operator as a principal or agent. 
 
The Multimodal Convention and third parties 
 
The Multimodal Convention tries to regulate relationships between multimodal 
transport operators and third parties or subcontractors. The applicable provisions, 
however, appear to be more well meaning than practically applicable.  
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Article 25, paragraph 4, provides that where a party seeking indemnification 
wishes to institute action, it must be instituted within 90 days after a claim was 
settled or after an action was issued against itself. It is however unlikely that 
actions between multimodal transport operator’s and subcontractors will be 
regulated by the Multimodal Convention as the majority of those actions are likely 
to be governed by the convention relating to the localisation of the damage.76  
 
Furthermore, Article 20, paragraph 2, introduces a “Himalaya” type clause for 
subcontractors for protection against the shipper or goods owner. Similarly, it is 
seldom that this protection will probably be relied on as such an action is, where 
the damage is localised, likely to be governed by the applicable local regime.77
 
The failings and successes of the Multimodal Convention 
 
There appear to be two main reasons for the failings of the Multimodal 
Convention. Firstly, the disruptive and unnecessary influence of political factors in 
the drafting process. It has been argued that UNCTAD was perhaps not the 
wisest choice of drafting body as it led to political issues influencing the drafting 
of what should just have been a consideration of technical issues.78   
 
These political interests included concerns by developing nations that the 
rationalisation of carriage may adversely effect their unemployment problems.79 
Some nations feared that a pure network system would lead to innumerable 
problems in trying to determine which convention would be applicable in certain 
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circumstances.  Other nations did not wish to leave the security of already 
applicable conventions.80
 
Although it has been argued that the arguments by nations against a uniform 
system were unjustified81, the large number of states representing important 
carriage interests bitterly opposed the adoption of a uniform system and a 
compromise was reached by adopting a “modified network” system, as 
demonstrated in the wording of Article 19.  
 
Secondly, the 1980 Convention was badly drafted.82 The very problem the 
drafters tried to achieve, namely clarity on which convention would apply where 
damage was localised was, in fact, compounded by vague drafting. This poor 
drafting resulted in “a lack of precision and uncertainty” in a number of important 
areas destroying the objective of providing multimodal transport operators with 
predictability on their rights and obligations.83
 
On the positive side, the Multimodal Convention has received praise for various 
improvements it made in areas that were unclear under the Hamburg Rules. The 
most positive step appears to have been the adoption a simple liability regime. 
The objective of adopting a “ principle of presumed fault or neglect”, effectively 
placing an onus on the carrier to disprove the presumption, was set out in the 
preamble to the Convention.84  
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The Multimodal Convention has not, however, been adopted as insufficient 
signatories have been deposited. Attention has now turned to the latest attempt 
at producing a uniform regime, the Draft Instrument. 
 




At the 29th session of The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (“UNCITRAL” or the Commission”), which was held in 1996, discussion 
turned to the lack of uniformity in international trade law.85 It was felt that the 
1996 UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce had exposed gaps 
between existing national laws on issues including; the functioning of bills of 
lading, their effect on the rights and obligation of sellers and buyers and the legal 
position of parties financing contracts of carriage.86  These gaps in the different 
national laws were considered an obstacle to the free flow of goods and a threat 
to an increase in the cost of transactions.87
 
It was suggested that the Secretariat of the Commission should gather views on 
the difficulties experienced by governments and other organisations involved in 
the carriage of goods by sea specifically. These views would then be analysed to 
allow the Commission to consider an appropriate course of action, and a possible 
new convention or regime.88
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There were reservations to the suggestion. One reservation was that a new 
liability regime would create further difficulties getting states to adhere to the 
Hamburg Rules and that the new proposal may lead to further disharmony of 
international laws. It was, however, stated that a review of the liability regimes 
was not the objective of the suggested work.89 The main objective would be to 
consider modern solutions to issues not adequately dealt with by existing treaties 
which would not adversely affect the prospects of future adoption of the Hamburg 
Rules by states.90
 
A proposal was therefore included in UNCITRAL’s work programme to “review 
current practices and laws in the area of the international carriage of goods by 
sea, with a view to establishing the need for uniform rules where no rules existed 
and with a view to achieving uniformity of laws.” The Secretariat was to be the 
focal point for gathering the information.91  It was agreed that the Comite 
Maritime International ("CMI") should be invited to assist the Secretariat and that 
the CMI should take the lead in gathering the information and creating a working 
document to be considered by the Commission, the invitation was accepted by 
the CMI.92
 
The mandate to the CMI had not included a consideration of a revised liability 
regime. A committee within the CMI had, however, already commenced work on 
the possible uniformity of legal regimes for the carriage of goods by sea under 
the supervision of Professor Berlingieri before the invitation was extended.93
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The CMI consulted with various international organisations to gather information. 
During discussions with the organisations it became clear that a strong desire 
existed for liability issues to be reviewed and that considerations of liability should 
be included in the report to the Commission.94  The executive counsel of the CMI 
was conscious that the liability regime was an essential consideration in the law 
of transport and that because the relevant liability regime impinged on the issues 
in the mandate95, it would be practically impossible to draft a set of rules capable 
of application if liability provisions were not included.96
 
The CMI therefore decided to; consider what areas of transport law greater 
international conformity could be achieved in, prepare the outline of an 
instrument designed to bring about uniformity, and then draft provisions for 
liability to be included in the proposed instrument.97 Professor Berlingieri’s work 
was thus absorbed into the CMI’s work on the mandate set out by the 
Commission.  
 
This approach was informally condoned by the Commission at an 
UNCITRAL/CMI Colloquium in July 2000. At the Colloquium suggestions were 
made to extend the regime beyond the sea leg to cover inland carriage before 
and after the sea leg.98
 
The Commission stated that “since a great and increasing number of contracts of 
carriage by sea, in particular in the liner trade of containerized cargo, included 
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land carriage before and after the sea leg, it was desirable to make provision in 
the draft instrument for the relationship between the draft instrument and 
conventions governing inland transport”. The CMI thus attempted to draft the 
necessary provisions which, as demonstrated in the drafting of the 1980 
Multimodal Convention, are notoriously difficult. 
 
The Commission’s initial mandate to the CMI had only required the collection of 
information and a possible draft instrument on issues particular to maritime 
transportation.  At a late stage in the drafting process the CMI were required to 
consider extending the provisions of a draft instrument to inland transport. The 
liability rules, which were drafted to apply to maritime transportation, were thus 
extended to other modes of transport without consulting the parties having an 
interest in the other modes of transport. The final draft instrument, therefore, 
essentially reflects maritime transport interests.99
 
The CMI took 3½  years to complete preparation of the CMI Draft Instrument on 
Transport Law, which has become known as the “Draft Instrument”. A completed 
draft was handed to the UNCITRAL Secretariat in December 2001. The CMI did 
not claim that the draft was perfect, but hoped that it would be constructive. A 
number of issues that had remained unresolved were bracketed and explained in 
a commentary to the draft.100  
 
Various matters already dealt with in existing regimes are covered in the Draft 
Instrument, these include; electronic commerce, liens, delivery, transport 
documents and aspects of the liability provisions of the Hague Visby and 
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Hamburg Rules.101 There were, however, no previous international laws or 
conventions covering; freight, rights of control, transfer of rights and rights of suit, 
regulations on these issues have now been included in the Draft.102
 
Drafting approximately nine conventions into one convention has been described 
as an enormous task.103  UNCITRAL has, subsequently, appointed a working 
group to consider the Draft Instrument, which is still conducting work sessions to 
reach a final draft. 
 
Theoretical model: network or uniform system 
 
The Draft Instrument has been based on a network system and contains similar 
“network” elements of the Multimodal Convention.  It is, however, a peculiar type 
of “network” system referred to as “minimal” network system and is set out in 
Article 4 of the Draft Instrument. 
 
Article 4 provides that the test for liability in the Draft Instrument, which is set out 
in Article 5, will generally apply where the localisation of damage occurs beyond 
the sea leg, in addition to its application to the sea leg. The provisions of the Draft 
Instrument relating to; the liability of the carrier, limitation of liability and time for 
suit will not, however,  apply when mandatory international conventions apply to 
damage occurring beyond the sea leg. Article 4 provides that the other provisions 
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contained in the Draft Instrument will not be removed when other international 
conventions are applicable to road, air, railway or inland carriage.104
 
The provisions of international conventions will only be applicable where the 
damage occurred undoubtedly and solely in the segment of transport regulated 
by the mandatory international conventions.105 A mandatory international 
convention is one that cannot be departed from by private contract or to the 
detriment of the shipper. 
 
The result of this "network” approach is that the determination of liability issues 
will continue to involve an examination of which particular regime is applicable 
when damage can be localised for land carriage. It is difficult to understand how 
this is an improvement on the current situation in multimodal transport or an 
improvement on the Multimodal Convention.  
 
The difficult matter that hits at the heart of a network system is the determination 
of the applicable legal regime when the localisation of damage cannot be 
pinpointed.106 The solution forwarded in the draft is interesting. If a party cannot 
prove where the place of damage occurred in non-maritime carriage, or where it 
cannot be proven what the sole cause of the damage was, then the provisions of 
the Draft Instrument shall apply over any other international convention or 
national law. 
 
An objection to this provision is that causation must be determined according to 
the law applicable at the alleged place of damage before determining whether the 
provisions of the Draft Instrument or another convention are applicable. 
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Furthermore, as the Draft Instrument does not contain rules on the burden of 
proof, a party wishing to rely on another unimodal convention will carry the 
burden of proving where the damage occurred and because this burden of proof 
will be subject to the relevant national laws in the place of jurisdiction it may lead 
to diverse results.107
 
The dividing line between the applicability of the Draft Instrument or a unimodal 
convention is therefore left to national laws governing the rules of proof in 
different jurisdictions. This solution does not reduce the uncertainty inherent in a 
network system of liability.108
 
The Draft Instrument also allow parties in contracting states various ways to "opt 
out” of the multimodal provisions.  If utilised by parties this will essentially make 
the Draft a non-multimodal project.109
 
“…can anyone explain when this convention will or will not apply?” 
William Tetley110
 
In addition, the Draft suffers from the same poor drafting technique evidenced in 
the Multimodal Convention. The drafting and meaning of Article 4 is puzzling and 
unclear111, as reflected in the above sentiment of Tetley. 
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UNCITRAL were involved in drafting the Convention on the Combined Transport 
Contract, 1970, (“the TCM”), which was an attempt at a uniform multimodal 
instrument. The airline industry was not consulted in the preparation of the TCM 
and, consequently, strenuously opposed its implementation.  It is therefore 
surprising that UNCITRAL considered the implementation of a multimodal 
network system without having consulted road and rail interests, insurers and 
cargo interests.112
 
The single minded drive among maritime interests for the revision of the legal 
regimes for sea carriage, which was extended to other modes at a late stage, is 
submitted to be an explanation for the slightly awry development of the network 
system in the draft.113
 
Basis of liability  
 
The Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules are based on the principle of presumed 
fault of the carrier. The two sets of rules differ, however, in their drafting. The 
Hamburg Rules contain a simple provision allocating the burden of proof, whilst 
the Hague-Visby Rules create a system where liability is determined by shifting 
the onus of proof between the carrier and shipper like a ping-pong match. The 
Draft Instrument is a complex amalgamation of the provisions of both the Hague-
Visby and Hamburg Rules with substantial modifications in terms of substance, 
text and structure.114
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Articles 5 and 6 of the Draft Instrument contain the substantive liability rules for 
determining liability when damage occurs. Article 5 states that the carrier is under 
a duty to carry the goods to the destination appointed by the consignor and to 
deliver them to the consignor. Article 5 of the Draft also sets out the fundamental 
obligation of the carrier to care for the ship and the goods.115
 
Article 6 contains a statement that the carrier is liable for loss or damage to the 
goods and for delay in delivery unless he proves that his fault, or that of any other 
person for whom he is responsible, caused or contributed to such loss, damage 
or delay. A list of “excepted perils” is then provided for which, if proven, damage 
will not be attributed to the fault of the carrier.116
 
The effect of combining the two sets of rules has been to alter their original terms 
of substance, structure and text. The benefit of certainty associated with the 
accepted interpretation of the original terms of these rules has therefore been 
compromised. International conventions should be as clear as possible to ensure 
their uniform application, however, the structure of the provisions in the Draft 
relating to substantive liability do not meet this standard.117 The new regime 
doesn’t provide clarity and there would therefore be little incentive to adopt it. 
 
Clash between the Multimodal Convention and the CMR 
 
The CMR is the most widely accepted carriage regime for goods transported by 
road in Europe and has become a settled means of resolving disputes.118 During 
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the preparation of the Draft Instrument it became clear that political influences, 
driven by support for the CMR, necessitated the drafting of a network system to 
allow for the CMR, and other land carriage regimes, to be applicable in 
appropriate circumstances.119 This should have been a foreboding notice about 
the ultimate future of the Draft. 
 
Similar to the attempts made in the Multimodal Convention, there are difficulties 
in determining what the applicable regime will be where the land and sea legs 
interface. Based on the current drafting, both the Draft Instrument and the CMR 
will be applicable where damage cannot be localised for goods transported on a 
truck which is itself carried for part of the journey by ship.120
 
It had initially been hoped that the issue of "networking" with the CMR and 
determining its applicability could possibly be side-stepped. Suggestions were 
made that a door to door contract governed by the Draft Instrument would not 
necessarily be subject to the CMR.121
 
The first rationale for this suggestion was the belief that a contract under the 
Draft Instrument did not fall within the CMR definition of a "contract for the 
transport of goods by road" even for the land stage.  This point was tested in 
Quantum Ltd v Plane Trucking Ltd ("Quantum").122 The court held that where a 
transport journey takes place by various modes of transport the land leg of that 
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mode will fall within the provisions of the CMR regardless of how insignificant that 
land leg may be, defeating this first theory. 
 
The second basis for the suggestion was that because goods could be taken 
over at the beginning of a sea leg the CMR would not apply because it applied 
from when goods are taken over by the "carrier" which would not be the carrier of 
the land leg. This view was also tested and rejected in Quantum. The court held 
that Article 1(1) of the CMR was to be read as being applicable to the road carrier 
taking over goods from the beginning of the land leg.123
 
It was thus clear that conflict with the CMR could not be avoided and that, due to 
political pressures, provisions would have to be made for the interaction of the 
regimes which has lead to some inconsistencies between the two. 
 
The liability provisions of the Draft Instrument are different to those of the CMR, 
an important difference are the proof and presumption provisions. In the CMR, 
and the COTIF from which it is copied, there are special risk provisions, which 
trigger presumptions for the cause of the damage. This is different from the Draft 
Instrument which is based an initial premise of negligence by the carrier. 
European judges would therefore be unaccustomed to the concepts and manner 
of thinking behind the Draft Instrument if it were adopted.124
 
The duty of care in the Draft is also different from the duty found in many land 
carriage regimes. Under the CMR the road carrier is relived of liability if the loss, 
damage or delay was caused by circumstances which the carrier could not have 
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avoided even by exercising the utmost due diligence. In the Draft, in terms of 
Article 5.4, the carrier must only exercise a reasonable standard of due diligence  
 
to make the ship. In terms of Article 6.1.3 the carrier will be excused for latent 
defects in the ship not discoverable by due diligence. 
 
In summary, the duty of care obligation in the Draft is of a significantly lower 
standard than the duty of utmost due diligence found in the CMR, it is also lower 
than the standard of care for an air carrier.125 The standard for duty of care 
incumbent upon a multimodal carrier will therefore be unpredictable at the 
commencement of his multimodal transport contract.  
 
Limits of liability 
 
The monetary limits of compensation for damage which may be claimed by cargo 
interests have not yet been agreed in the Draft Instrument and have been left in 
blank.126  The preparatory documents show that the drafters consider the figures 
in the Hague-Visby Rules as a good starting point for determining the monetary 
limits of compensation.127  This approach has received sharp criticism and will be 
a serious concern for cargo owning interests.128
 
The limits in the Hague-Visby Rules are low compared to the limits in land 
transport conventions. The Hague-Visby Rules provide for a limit of 2 Special  
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Drawing Rights per Kilogram (SDR per Kg) whereas the CMR has a limit of 8.33 
SDR per Kg. The German version of the CMR, the TRG, also has a limit of 8,33 
SDR. The COTIF and the Montreal Convention, 1999, for air transport both have 
a limit of 17 SDR per Kg.129 The drafter's approach indicates that limits in the 
Draft instrument is likely to fall well short of the limits in land carriage 
conventions. 
 
Other sea carriage conventions, including the Hamburg Rules and the 1980 
Multimodal Convention, to the extent that it covers sea transport, have limitation 
values which have taken account of currency erosion and  have increased their 
monetary limits leaving the Hague Visby Rule limits behind on unrealistic 
values.130
 
It has been argued that if the final limits are lower than those of the CMR there is 
no reason why they should be applied to the land legs of carriage under the Draft 
Instrument, because whatever exceptional circumstances may warrant low limits 
of liability at sea do not exist on land.131 It has also been submitted that the 
technical superiority of modern ships and advanced navigation techniques have 
surpassed the grounds upon which the rather outdated provisions of liability were 
established when ocean transport was perhaps more hazardous.132
 
In terms of Article 6, paragraph 8, the multimodal carrier will lose the right to limit 
liability if the damage to goods under his care resulted from a personal act or 
omission and was caused with intent or recklessness with knowledge that such 
damage or loss would probably result. The wording of this provision is repeated 
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almost verbatim from the Convention on Limitations of Liability for Maritime 
Claims,1976, ("the LLMC Convention") where the aim of the drafters was to set 
an almost unbreakable limit in exchange for high limitation amounts.133
 
The effect of using the word “personal” means that only the act or omission of a 
senior management official committed with the requisite intent would be sufficient 
to break the limitation and, conversely, that the personal act or omission of 
persons such as the master and crew members would never break the limit, no 
matter how intentionally committed.134
 
In the discussion papers on the Draft Instrument it is evident that the drafters 
made the deliberate decision that the actions of the servant or agent of the 
multimodal carrier should not defeat the carrier’s right to limit liability.135  This 
tough requirement to pierce the liability ceiling is higher than most conventions. It 
may be justified if there were strong indications that the monetary limit would be 
quite high, but at the moment there are none. The limitation provisions are, as a 
whole, unsatisfactory. 
 
The position of third parties and subcontractors under the Draft Instrument 
 
Multimodal carriers seldom perform all aspects of the carriage themselves. Even 
large multimodal operators subcontract aspects of the carriage to stevedores, 
terminal operators and other carriers with carriage equipment facilities and 
vehicles. Some carriers, particularly non vessel operating carriers perform none 
of the carriage themselves and specialise in subcontracting their performance 
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obligations.136 It is therefore understandable that the drafters of the Draft 
Instrument agreed, during preparatory discussions, that one of the ways to 
overcome potential problems in the application of the Draft Instrument from door 
to door was to include third parties and ensure that they were treated as 
appropriately as possible.137
 
Greater attention has been paid to the role of subcontractors and other third 
parties in the drafting of the Draft Instrument than in the Multimodal Convention. 
Previous efforts to deal with subcontracted parties who actually performed the 
carriage appeared in the Hamburg Rules, the other earlier carriage regimes, 
however, did not feature any attempted provisions.  
 
The Hamburg Rules introduced the concept of an "actual carrier" which included 
any of the carrier's employees, agents and subcontractors.138 The preparatory 
texts of the Draft Instrument introduced a concept known as “performing carrier”. 
This was criticised as being too narrow as many parties are not involved in actual 
"carriage" and it was later expanded to “performing party”.139 The advantage of a 
wider definition was that all litigation for cargo damage could be regulated by a 
uniform liability regime regardless of a parties' role in the carriage transaction.  
 
The International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations ("FIATA")140 
was particularly concerned that such a wide definition might apply to its members 
who had no intention of actually performing any of the freight and would 
consequently find themselves liable for a subcontractors actions. FIATA, 
therefore, motivated a narrower definition for the final draft which has been 
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carried forward for consideration to UNCITRAL. There is still, however, support 
for a wider definition and it is not yet a resolved issue.141  
 
The network structure of the Draft Instrument prompted various delegates to 
consider provisions for the protection of cargo interests' rights against performing 
carriers or parties who were not the contracted carrier. Italian delegates proposed 
that cargo interests should be able to sue inland perfuming contractors on a 
subrogation basis with the non-performing contracted carrier. A cargo claimant 
could therefore recover from an inland performing party on the same basis as the 
door to door contracting carrier could have.142
 
In opposition, the United States proposed that where claims against an inland 
carrier arose, cargo interests should be free to sue under the existing laws. Both 
delegations agreed that for maritime performing parties the Draft Instrument 
would recognise a direct cause of action on its own terms. Although 
overwhelming support was received in favour of the US proposal the issue has 
still not been finalised.143
 
During the drafting process FIATA also argued that the liability provisions should 
be removed for third parties, however, other delegates involved in the drafting 
process agreed that the convention should ultimately provide a liability regime 
that was as uniform as possible.144 This goal was always going to be problematic 
as the deference paid to the CMR in order encourage the accession of European 
countries to the draft had resulted in a network system.  
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Another debated issue which has still not been finalised is the inclusion of an 
automatic "Himalaya" clause extending protection to all subcontractors who 
would be able to invoke the carriers defences and limits of liability.145 This was 
attempted under the Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules but legal obstacles were 
encountered in its application. Nevertheless, its inclusion is indicative of the 
intentions to ensure uniform treatment for all parties to a multimodal contract and 
thus uniformity, even though many issues are still not settled. 
 
The failings and successes of the Draft Instrument 
 
Sadly, it is very difficult to find commentary on the successes of the Draft 
Instrument. In general, it has been severely and roundly criticized for falling well 
short of the requirements expected in a draft convention to be considered for 
international acceptance.  
 
The Draft Instrument re-highlights some of the problems already demonstrated 
by the Multimodal Convention, which remain unsolved. It also raises some new 
problems. Perhaps the most positive way of looking at the Draft Instrument is to 
welcome the new problems it has highlighted which may be constructive as 
guidelines for the future implementation of a uniform regime. 
 
The thrust of the criticism is that the CMI has prepared a draft convention which 
only covers inland transport when a sea leg is involved.146 This criticism of the 
CMI’s effort is unfair. If one looks at the origins of the project it is clear that the 
initial mandate handed to the CMI was based on the inconsistencies being 
experienced at sea. To expect a draft providing a solution for a uniform transport 
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regime when the mandate was only changed at a vary late stage is 
unreasonable. Some of the prominent criticisms are canvassed below. 
 
The Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules only apply to the carriage of goods by sea. 
The draft, being an amalgamation of both, extends this liability regime to other 
modes of transport where possible.147  It was probably unwise to expect a 
maritime regime to be a suitable base for a multimodal transport regime 
particularly in light of the difficulties and criticisms relating to the Hague-Visby 
Rules. The disparity between the Hamburg and Hague-Visby Rules and the time 
it has taken, without success, to get maritime countries to reach an agreement on 
which is more suitable should also have been an indication that an amalgamation 
of the legal regimes for sea carriage do not present a stable base for a 
multimodal transport regime. 
 
Roseag points out that the maritime liability regime should not be extended to 
circumstances for which they were not made, being terminal storage periods and 
on-carriage by road. The reasons for limits and exceptions which may have been 
warranted for a sea-leg do not exist on land, and may in fact, in light of 
developments in sea transport, no longer exist for sea carriage either.148
 
Conversely, Tetley strongly advocates that the drafting of a multimodal transport 
document should begin with the Hague-Visby Rules because it is estimated that 
75% of the world trade is conducted under the Hague-Visby Rules. He argues 
that if nations already subscribing to the Hague-Visby text are ever going to be 
convinced to change to the new convention it would need to be based on these 
Rules in order to encourage transition. His second choice for a basis for drafting 
a multimodal regime would be the Hamburg Rules, because twenty nine nations 
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have adopted these Rules.149 In light of the above submissions, Tetley's position 
seems unlikely to succeed. Furthermore, as discussed in detail below, the Hague 
Visby Rules are very different in format to the conventions for the other unimodal 
forms of transport. 
 
The Draft Instrument "can" apply to land carriage where a sea leg is included in a 
multimodal transport contract. Although this flows well with the trend that sea 
carriers now arrange for carriage of goods from door to door on uniform terms, it 
does leave a gap open for a carrier to consider avoiding a sea leg in multimodal 
transport, if possible, thereby attracting a different legal regime if damage occurs. 
Critics are not satisfied that there exists any reason why a carrier’s liability should 
vary according to how he exercises this option.150
 
“Who’s in charge here?” 
John F Kennedy 
 
Tetley refers to this quote when criticizing the procedure adopted in preparing the 
Draft Instrument. He suggests that the drafters failed to take decisions between 
the different viewpoints forwarded by the parties involved in the consultative 
process, possibly because of the pressures exerted by these parties. He 
suggests that the draft represents a summation of the ideas forwarded by all 
these bodies.151
 
The consultative organizations which attended the subcommittee meetings 
included; NGO’s, trade associations, FIATA, Canada’s CIFFA, the NITL, the 
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World Shipping Council, Ship owning bodies, P&I clubs and others. Each of 
these bodies had differing views that, ultimately, are reflective of their personal 
agendas.  The trade associations were also allowed to join in with delegates 
representing particular nations in the “show of hands” on various points as to 
whether there was consensus. No wonder so much is undecided and has been 
included in square brackets.152
 
Tetley suggests that drafters have confused consultation and participation with 
decision taking153, he appears to be advocating that the appointed drafters make 
the final decision after having heard all parties' views, rather than invite a 
consultative process on the final draft. Based on the cumbersome nature of the 
Draft Instrument and the length of time for which undecided provisions have 
remained under consideration, this criticism is worth noting. 
 
“We have bitten off more than we can chew” 
William Tetley 
 
Tetley questions whether all the various components of a number of international 
conventions can be drafted into one convention to cover; multimodal carriage, 
negotiability, electronic commerce, freight, liens, rights of control, transport 
docuemnts, liability and delivery. He suggests that it was perhaps too great a 
task at this stage and that to complete such a job may in fact take more time than 
the 3½ years taken by the CMI to prepare a draft.154 This seems to be a valid 
criticism.  
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Tetley also comments that the body of jurisprudence created by the Hague, 
Hague Visby and Hamburg Rules will be worthless as the new law, language, 
terminology and numbering of the Draft is so different from the existing body of 
jurisprudence that it will not be understood. This problem will not only be 
experienced by legal practitioners but by merchants as well.155
 
In the comments on the draft made the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) it was concluded that the draft was not appropriate for covering 
multimodal transport. Although UNECE lauded the contributions made by the 
CMI to maritime transport it was felt that an acceptable multimodal transport 
convention would be better achieved by consulting with and considering the 
needs of parties with vested interests operating outside of maritime transport.156  
For UNECE to raise this criticism when the mandate to the CMI was changed at 
a late stage is an unnecessary slap in the face for the CMI. 
 
A similar slap is delivered by UNCTAD who have condemned the draft as 
unworkable and likely to be incapable of practical application, citing it as 
"complex", "difficult to understand" and "moving away from accepted wording and 
interpretations". The main failing being attributed to the drafters having 
represented maritime interests only. 
 
Alcantara suggests that the draft will not help procure international uniformity as 
the draft does not embrace multimodal transport through any combined modes 
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and, because of the various “opting outs”, it is set to become “another solution” 
only.157
 
The complexity and style of the drafting has been criticised as marking a return to 
more traditional methods of drafting. The method of specificity and complexity 
which has been employed was purposefully avoided when drafting the Hamburg 
Rules in favour of more general concepts. This trend has recently been followed 
in the re-drafting of other carriage conventions. On the rails the COTIF is less 
detailed then the old and, similarly, in the air the Montreal Convention is less 
detailed then its predecessor.158
 
Despite the criticisms of the Draft it is currently the only tenable solution for a 
harmonized multimodal transport regime being considered by UNCITRAL. The 
“Working  Group on Transport Law” created by UNCITRAL to consider the Draft 
completed its 13th session on the draft in New York in May 2004159 but, seven 
years after work commenced on its preparation, there are still many unresolved 
issues in the Draft Instrument and, surely, many more sessions to follow. 
 
In light of these criticisms one must ask whether the Draft Instrument is not 
already destined for failure? How many more years will be invested on the project 
before a viable conclusion is reached? Is it destined to be a shelf-mate of the 
Multimodal Convention? Has the time not come to ask whether it is not better to 
abandon the Draft Instrument and begin again? 
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Abandon or persevere with the Draft Instrument? 
 
“Round and round the mulberry bush” 
Nursery Rhyme 
 
The quest for an answer to the problems facing multimodal transport seems to 
have gone round and round in circles since 1913. As lamented by Clarke in his 
reference to Ecclesiastes, “all things are wearisome…there is nothing new 
underneath the sun”, the drive for a uniform transport regime seems to have 
succumbed to a large degree of drafting fatigue.160
 
In my opinion, the options open to the drafters are to persist with the Draft 
Instrument, start again with a new structure for a multimodal regime or abandon 
the quest for a universal multimodal regime altogether. 
 
Firstly, it seems sadly clear from the weight of the criticisms already discussed 
that there is not a future for the Draft Instrument in its current format. Too much 
seems to have been overlooked in the drafting process and the use of a maritime 
regime as a basis for one of the integral clauses in a multimodal regime, namely 
the basis for determining liability, was ill-advised. The effort being expended on 
the Draft Instrument should be discontinued. 
 
Secondly, an examination is required of whether the process should begin again 
or whether the quest should be abandoned altogether.  Let us first try and single 
out the crucial ingredient that is needed before a new convention is pursued. 
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“It worries me that this issue of “compelling need” is often glossed over in 
the early stages of discussion of a new harmonizing instrument. By the 
time the issue is addressed, the forward momentum that the project has 
developed meanwhile cannot be checked. An unwanted, unloved and 
therefore ungratified convention may then be the result. 
 
What should we learn from this? In analysing the success or failure of a 
convention, we may be forced to conclude that the area of the law covered 
by the instrument was not suitable for harmonization because there was 
no compelling need, and that time, in consequence, has probably been 
wasted” 
Patrick J.S. Griggs161
The Nicholas J. Healy Lecture 2002162
 
The above quote is quite long but has been reproduced because of its gravity 
and the déjà vu effect it certainly has on me. It is not hard to think of a draft 
convention that is “unwanted, unloved and ungratified”. The Multimodal 
Convnetion and, potentially, the Draft Instrument, fill the criteria. It is also not 
hard to think of a project which “cannot be checked” because of the development 
of “forward momentum”, the four years spent considering the Draft Instrument 
qualifies it to fill this category. This statement referred to various other attempted 
conventions which had failed prior to the presentation of the lecture. At that stage 
high hopes were still being held for the development of the Draft Instrument. It 
seems, however, that “the wheel hath come full circle”163. 
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The thoughts of Mr Griggs resonate in the words of Mr Justice Hobhouse, as he 
then was: 
“What should no longer be tolerated is the unthinking acceptance of a goal 
of uniformity…only conventions which demonstrably satisfy the well 
proven needs of the commercial community should be ratified…”164
 
In 1980 Anthony Diamond ,Q.C., who has been involved in the drafting of the  
Draft Instrument, said; 
 
“There can be said to be a need for the general adoption of a new sea carriage 
convention but there is no comparable need for a multimodal convention.”165
 
This view proved correct, the 1980 Convention was not ratified and neither it 
seems will the Draft Instrument any time soon. The message is clear. There must 
be “a compelling need" for a harmonised regime before drafters begin the 
process. It must, therefore, be determined whether such a compelling need exists 
for a uniform multimodal regime. 
 
Diana Faber166 argues that enormous sums are being spent on legal disputes 
regarding the conflicting terms of conventions for transport and that these funds 
would be better spent investing in the industry. She argues that although 
establishing a precedent for such a convention may mean legal expenditure in 
the short term, it would remove many of the current problems and costs faced by 
the industry.167  
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The CMI and UNCITRAL have expressed concern over the growing dis-
unification of regimes governing sea carriage. Various states have made 
modifications to the various sea conventions resulting in a unilateral and 
piecemeal procedure for the breaking down of uniformity into a multiplicity of 
legal regimes.168 Furthermore, there appear to be more national laws and 
regional agreements developing, there are also more than 20 countries drawing 
their own responses to multimodal transportation. 
 




The threat of this development is that states will become settled in the application 
of their modified laws and resistant to change. This will create even greater 
confusion should a multimodal regime be implemented. Diana Faber believes the 
best way forward would to be to abolish all the individual conventions and 
introduce one which would ultimately govern all transport contracts.  
 
“What the transport industry needs…is consistency and uniformity. This 
means that an ideal world will bring the replacement of the existing 
unimodal conventions with a single transport convention. Sadly, there are 
all too few signs that the prospect of living in an ideal world is getting any 
better.”  
Chris Hilton170
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Currently, multimodal transportation creates confusion over conflicting laws 
leading to money being spent on legal costs to resolve these problems. There 
appears to be little doubt that a single or harmonized regime will bring order to 
the chaos caused by conflicting legal regimes. A “compelling need”, which will 
ultimately have to be driven by commercial interests is, however, necessary. 
Unfortunately, although it seems that the savings to the industry as a whole 
would be beneficial, this "compelling need" does not appear to exist. 
 
Perhaps it is because individual multimodal transport operators experience the 
legal problems facing multimodal transport sporadically and not on a consistent 
basis leaving them unaware of the overall effect of the problems. This possibly 
results in the issues being dealt with as a passing headache or "just part of 
running a business".  
 
The overall effect of the problem would probably only be appreciated if viewed 
collectively by multimodal transport operators. A possible solution to create a 
“compelling need" would therefore be to motivate the commercial bodies and 
representatives of industries most affected by the problems and financial losses 
as a whole, to rally for change.  
 
Until this desire is created it would seem that the pervading lethargy of finding a 
solution will add further draft conventions to the list of historical attempts. In my 
opinion, the drafting of a uniform regime should therefore be abandoned until a 
compelling need is clearly established.  
 
Let us hope that an injection of enthusiasm is experienced sometime in the 21st 
century. It would reflect poorly on the creativity of legal minds if, in the future, no 
solution is reached, legal regimes for transport through space and underwater 
may bring even further disharmony. 
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In the event that a compelling need is established, justifying the process starting 
again, I have set out some important points below, which, I believe, should be 




Identifying fundamental issues 
 
In my research on the preparatory work done for both the Multimodal Convention 
and the Draft Instrument I noted that in depth consideration was not given to 
whether a multimodal regime should be based on the network or uniform system. 
Obviously the latter is more favourable and should ideally be pursued but it is 
predicated upon the assumption that the differing regimes for each form of 
transport could ultimately be adapted or woven into one. It this point that has 
perhaps not received proper consideration. The question must be asked whether 
the legal regimes for each mode of transport are so innately related to the nature 
of the corresponding mode of transport that a harmonized set of rules would not 
recognise the specific nuances of each form of transport? 
 
This question should be the starting point for drafting a multimodal convention. If 
drafters are aware that a true uniform system would never be effective in practice 
and the reasons for such failure, a better framework will be available to start with, 
even if it means that a modified network model must be used, at least the drafters 
can focus on the major problems. 
 
I believe that the two main obstacles to a uniform system being implemented are 
agreement on a basis for liability and monetary limits of liability. The questions 
that must therefore be asked are, firstly, is it possible for a single liability test to 
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apply to all modes of transport or are they so innately different that they require 
different liability tests? Secondly, is it possible to set a uniform monetary limit on 
liability for each mode of transport or do the risks in the different modes justify 
different monetary limits of liability for each mode? If the answer to either of these 
questions is “no”, it will be necessary to deviate from a strict uniform system. 
 
It may seem naïve to suggest that the answers to these questions would indicate 
whether a uniform system is fundamentally possible, however, in defence of this 
approach I would argue that the other criticisms discussed above, focused on 
political issues, legal theory and practical application. The political disputes are 
well documented and were influenced by the trade objectives of the bodies 
involved in the drafting. The legal concerns focused on the clash of conventions 
and the difficulties in interpretation and application. I do not wish to suggest that 
these issues are not complex, it is rather my submission that they are dependant 
upon politics and legal ideologies reaching agreement rather than the factual 
possibility of whether a uniform system can be used as a base for a multimodal 
transport regime. 
 
Comparing bases of liability 
 
I now turn to considering whether it is possible for a single liability test to apply to 
all modes of transport or whether they are so innately different that they require 
different liability tests?  
 
The Hague, Hague-Visby, Hamburg, COTIF/CIM, CMR and Warsaw system 
were drafted with the same basic goal in mind; to try and create an equitable risk 
allocation between carrier and cargo interests. Generally, the carrier surrenders a 
large portion of his contractual freedom by submitting to a minimum standard of 
liability out of which he cannot contract but in return the carrier obtains a number 
 60
of exceptions and in those cases where his liability is established, a maximum 
limit for compensation is agreed. In practice, this has actually been decided more 
by bargaining power than by economic factors, legal consideration or logic.  
 
The background to each of these carrier liability provisions can be sourced either 
from roots in the continental or common law systems. The common law system 
of carrier liability developed under a branch of the law of bailment, which was not 
found in continental systems and provides the basis for the differences that 
developed between the systems regarding carrier liability.171
 
The common law system adopted the general rule that a carrier would be found 
strictly liable for damages to goods, meaning that liability could be imposed 
without any fault of the carrier being present.172  In addition, under common law, 
a carrier of goods by sea was held to give an absolute warranty of 
seaworthiness. 
 
In contradistinction, a carrier’s contractual liability in continental law systems was 
one of presumed fault or neglect in the event of damage or loss, which 
presumption could be rebutted by a carrier.173 The general nature of the 
continental system was less severe than the common law system’s strict “no 
fault” liability, because it was negligence based.174  
 
Under the common law system the carrier could, however, escape liability if he 
could prove that the cause of the damage fell within one of the accepted 
exceptions, which were narrowly defined, the carrier would have to prove the 
existence of an exception to prove there was no negligence. This entails an 
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objective examination which, in effect, relates only to the causation requirement, 
as the proof of a listed exception would mean that the only cause of the damage 
was something or someone else other than the carrier.175
 
Conversely, the exception clauses developed under the continental systems 
were traditionally less clearly defined. If a carrier could prove that vague concepts 
such as “overwhelming force” or “factors beyond the control of a carrier” were the 
cause of the damage the carrier would escape liability. This approach simply 
developed into a procedure where all carrier had to prove was that he was not 
negligent in the causation of damage. This illustrates the basic negligence-
orientated approach of continental law carrier liability.176
 
It is, therefore, an interesting exercise to compare which systems the current 
regimes are based on. This would help determine whether they can ultimately be 
amalgamated into a single regime. 
 
The Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules, are notably different to the other 
conventions considered here. The Hague Rules were signed at Brussels on 25 
August 1924 as a convention intended as set of rules which could be 
incorporated into a contract of carriage on a voluntary basis. 
 
The Hague Rules were a compromise between shipping interests and cargo 
interests which ended a period which had allowed very wide ranging exclusion 
clauses in bills of lading.177 The compromise provided for a number of 
compulsory duties which the shipowner could not escape whilst allowing him a 
sufficient number of exemptions to liability and a monetary limitation to liability.178 
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The effect of the compromise makes the liability system difficult to classify under 
the continental negligence theory or the strict liability system of common law. 
 
The carrier has an overriding obligation to exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy, to properly man, equip and supply  the ship, and to make all 
parts of the vessel safe for the reception, carriage and preservation of cargo.179 
This is the dilution of the carrier’s absolute warranty of seaworthiness at common 
law.180  Furthermore, the carrier is under a duty to properly and carefully load, 
handle stow and care for the goods carried.181 The carrier cannot exempt himself 
from these overriding obligations. 
 
The carriers contractual duty is to deliver the goods at their intended destination, 
in the same order and condition in which they were when shipped and to do so in 
time, without delay. This obligation is so general that it would be recognised 
under both common law and continental law systems. The actual effect of the 
Hague Rules is that the strict duty of the carrier at common law is alleviated and 
substituted with duties of due diligence. The Rules do not allow the carrier to 
reduce his liability beyond the excepted perils and limits, which is characteristic of 
both the continental and common law systems. This final arrangement represents 
the compromise negotiated between shipping interests and cargo interests.182
 
Provided a carrier has exercised the required due diligence for the above 
obligations he may rely on a number of excepted perils to escape liability for 
damage to cargo183. The list of exceptions is referred to as the “Hague Rules 
catalogue”, this list appears in Article 4, Section 2 of the Hague Rules. It has 
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been noted that the exceptions are a mixture of the common law and continental 
law exceptions.184
 
The Hague Rules essentially creates a system of liability for negligence with a 
reversed burden of proof. When compared to other regimes, this system is the 
most difficult to catalogue. It is, however, best catalogued under the negligence 
theory as the overall effect of the Hague Rules resembles this system.185
 
In the 1950’s it became apparent that there were certain areas of difficulty in the 
Hague Rules which prompted the CMI to consider drafting amendments. The 
Hague Rules were subsequently amended by the Visby Protocol. The scope of 
the amendments were surprisingly limited and constituted not much more than a 
“face-lift” to the Hague Rules. It is suggested that this has been the main reason 
why many states have not adopted the amended version, the United States, for 
example, still applies the Hague Rules186, in addition to its own 1936 COGSA. 
 
The Visby Protocol did not influence the overall system of liability applied under 
the Hague Rules and the revised Hague-Visby Rules can be similarly classified, 
being an application of the negligence theory with a reversed onus of proof. 
 
From 1970 onwards there was a movement to replace the “complicated” Hague 
and Hague-Visby Rules with a totally new convention, this convention was 
drafted under the auspices of UNCITRAL. It was signed at Hamburg in 1978 and 
became known as the Hamburg Rules which were met with both acclaim and 
criticism. 
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The liability provision of the Hamburg Rules replaced the complicated liability 
system of the Hague-Visby Rules with a simple liability rule contained in Article 5, 
section1, which states: 
 
“The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of or damage to the goods, 
as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, 
damage or delay took place while the goods were in his charge as defined 
in article 4, unless the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took 
all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence 
and its consequences.” 
 
This mirrors the described negligence theory. It has been argued that the system 
is too simple but is has found wide favour and was adopted as the preferred 
system of liability for the 1980 Multimodal Convention.187 It is argued that the 
flexibility of the negligence system allows courts to draw the fundamental 
principles out of earlier case law to assist in clearly defining in what 
circumstances a carrier should be exempted from liability. In addition, it allows for 
new situations to be considered on their merits.188
 
The CMR has less complicated origins than the sea carriage conventions and 
was a response to liability concerns of road carriers during the increased growth 
of international road traffic after World War II. The liability system of the CMR is 
based upon the negligence theory which reflects influences of certain 
compromises agreed between carrier and cargo interests.189
 
                                                 




The system holds the carrier liable for loss or damage to goods which occurs 
during the time they are taken into his care until delivery, unless he can prove 
that the loss was caused by circumstances which he could not avoid and the 
consequences of which he could not prevent.190  The only way in which the CMR 
deviates from the negligence theory is by replacing the standard of reasonable 
care due by the carrier with one of “utmost care”. This has lead a number of 
commentators to argue that the system of liability behind the CMR is in fact one 
of strict liability but this approach has been widely challenged and appears to be 
a view held only by some German jurists. 
 
The CMR does, however, have a rather complex distribution of proof as the 
negligence principle is qualified by a provision creating a presumption that where 
one of the listed “special risks” are present and could have caused the damage, it 
is deemed that this special risk was in fact the cause of the damage.191 The 
cargo claimant may however deliver proof to the contrary and place the onus 
back on the carrier if successful.192 These special risks are listed under Article 
17, section 4 of the CMR. 
 
The international convention for rail carriage, COTIF, is the oldest convention and 
the first version was published in 1890 after the commercial success of the 
railways became increasingly evident. The current convention has an annexure, 
RU-CIM193, which sets out the liability provisions to apply when goods are 
damaged, referred to as "COTIF/CIM". 
 
The CMR was used as a basis for the liability regime currently applied in 
COTIF/CIM, the negligence theory is thus evident.  A railway carrier who has 
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received the goods for carriage will be liable for damage to goods which occurred 
between the time that the railway accepted the goods for carriage and the time of 
delivery.194  The railway carrier will be discharged from liability if it proves that the 
damage was caused by circumstances it could not avoid and the consequences 
of which it was unable to prevent.195 The standard of care incumbent on the 
carrier is one of utmost care, mirroring the standard of care obligation under the 
CMR.196
 
The COTIF/CIM also affords the carrier the right to rely upon a list events which 
will be deemed to have been the cause of the damage if they can be proven, but 
are rebuttable by the claimant197. 
 
“The unification system is doomed to fail through its own dynamics. The 
most dramatic example is the Warsaw System for air carriage”198
 
There is a lack of conformity in conventions currently regulating carriage by air 
carriage, referred to above as the “doom’ of unification. I would argue that the 
situation is not that dire. 
 
The original Warsaw Convention, which first provided a liability regime for air 
carriage, was concluded in 1929 when air traffic was in its infancy and the 
creation of a harmonized legal regime was relatively simple. The convention 
initially enjoyed success and was ratified by almost every country in the world. In 
1955 amendments were considered to the liability provisions which lead to a 
revamping of the Warsaw Convention. There has, however, been dissatisfaction 
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with the provisions for damage to goods in the 1955 Convention. The 1955 
Convention has not been adopted by the United States and despite a proposed 
protocol199 to amend the Convention, which was done to appease the interests of 
the United States, it appears unlikely that they will adopt it.200
 
The most recent protocols proposing amendments on liability provisions and 
limits consist of four adopted in Montreal in 1975, these have not yet come into 
force. The overall system, including the protocols, is referred to as the “Warsaw 
System”. The 1955 Warsaw Convention is the central convention and will be 
analysed here as it is still the most widely applied. 
 
Despite the confusion of the above plethora of conventions and protocols, the 
liability system of the Warsaw Convention does give one hope as it essentially 
adopts the negligence theory with a reversal of the burden of proof.201  It is, 
however, arguably tainted by some factors indicative of a strict liability system 
and its continued application of the negligence theory is threatened by the 
Montreal Protocol No.4 that proposes a system of strict liability for a common air 
carrier, a system which has thus far been avoided by all major conventions.202
 
In terms of the 1955 Warsaw Convention, the air carrier will be held liable for 
damage or loss of goods if the event causing the loss took place during the 
carriage by air, unless the carrier can prove that he and his servants took all 
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for them to 
take such measures.203
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Some of the wording contained in the negligence provisions of Article 18 and 
Article 20 Warsaw Convention, such as “all necessary measures” and “measures 
impossible to take”, is slightly different from the other liability regimes. These 
terms point towards the continental objective theory of strict liability as opposed 
to the negligence theory and some academics have argued that this points 
towards a very high standard of care being applied204, a standard possibly even 
higher then the CMR.205 The standard of care required by the carrier is, however, 
unevenly applied in different jurisdictions, although the bulk of the argument is 
that a standard of reasonable care should be applied206. The Warsaw convention 
does not provide a list of exculpatory clauses to avoid liability. 
 
In summary, the basis upon which liability is determined under the majority of the 
different conventions is by application of the negligence theory with a reverse 
onus of proof. The Hamburg Rules, CMR and COTIF/CIM are the closest to each 
other in terms of their adherence to the negligence theory.  
 
The Hague Rules, Hague-Visby Rules and Warsaw System, although falling to 
be classified under the negligence theory, stand a bit further away from the 
archetypical model of the negligence theory. The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules 
are removed from the archetypical model because of their complicated system 
and unique exceptions, and the Warsaw System because of its possible 
inclination towards strict liability which will be achieved if the Montreal Protocol 
No.4 is adopted, the Warsaw System is otherwise closer to the Hamburg Rules, 
CMR and COTIF/CIM than the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules. 
 
If we were to just focus on the Hamburg, CMR, COTIF/CIM and Warsaw System, 
ie. leaving out the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, the main obstacle facing 
                                                 
204 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 129. 
205 Clarke, M "A conflict of conventions: The UNCITRAL / CMI draft transport instrument on your 
doorstep" (2003) 9 The Journal of International Maritime Law 35. 
 69
drafters intending to harmonise the liability tests for these four regimes would be 
the differing standards of care and the differing “special risks” afforded under the 
CMR and COTIF/CIM. 
 
The reasons for the differing standards of care do not appear to be based on the 
nature of the mode of transport itself. It is hard to imagine what possible different 
risks between the modes of transport should alter the standard of care incumbent 
on a carrier.  
 
It is argued that the differing risks, if any, which may have been influential upon 
carriers when the regimes were drafted, are no longer present due to 
technological developments.207  For example, it was perhaps understandable 
that the original Warsaw Convention exempted an air carrier from liability for an 
error in navigation or management of the aircraft, however, due to the 
advancement of aeronautics, this exemption was deleted in 1955.208 Similarly, it 
is argued that ocean carrying vessels are no longer facing “an undertaking of 
great adventure” due to the various technological developments in shipping.209
 
The differences between standards of care in the different regimes appear not to 
have been based on the risks or nature of the differing modes of transport, but 
rather on the strength of the negotiating positions of the parties at the time of 
drafting.210 There does not, therefore, appear to a reason why the different 
standards of care should be maintained. 
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There also appears to be no reason why the “special risks” in the CMR and 
COTIF/CIM could be discarded at some stage, similar to the manner in which the 
Hague and Hague-Visby “exceptions” were dumped in the Hamburg Convention, 
thus allowing judges the flexibility to draw on principles established from case law 
to apply to differing circumstances.  
 
This reasoning leads me to conclude that the liability tests of the Hamburg, CMR, 
COTIF/CIM and Warsaw System can practically be combined into a single 
liability test. An obstacle is, however, created by the inclination of the Warsaw 
System to apply a strict liability test. Fortunately, the Montreal Protocol No.4 has 
not yet been widely adopted and one would hope that jurists would realize that 
there appears to be no reason why a strict system of liability should be adopted 
into aviation law. 
 
Combining the liability tests of the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules into a 
uniform liability test is a more daunting task. The clash of the Hague, Hague-
Visby and Hamburg Rules is enough to make one feel a little sea-sick.  Drafters 
of the Hamburg Rules have been particularly disappointed as it was expected 
that they would come into force quite soon when they were drafted. This was one 
of the reasons that the Hamburg rules were used as a base, and in some clauses 
copied identically, for the Multimodal Convention.211
 
The differences between the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules and the other 
conventions discussed above makes it clear that it is the least suitable to be used 
as a base for Multimodal carriage, in retrospect it is understandable that the Draft 
Instrument was headed for failure, although one must sympathise with the CMI 
who initially only set out to harmonise the legal regimes at sea. 
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As the optimal system for carrier liability has been said to be a system of simple 
liability for negligence with a reversal of the burden of proof212, as applied in the 
Hamburg Rules, it would facilitate the adoption of a uniform multimodal regime if 
such a system could be prevalent or adopted at sea. There is no doubt that the 
Hamburg rules draw shipping liability provisions closer to the liability provisions of 
other modes of transport.  
 
Whether a single liability test can be expected to harmonise all modes of 
transport would, therefore, seem to depend on maritime interests sorting out the 
clash of conventions at sea.  The adoption of the Hamburg Rules or a new 
system founded on the negligence theory would be the ideal step towards 
ultimately facilitating a single liability test for a multimodal transport regime. 
 
Without going into a debate on the merits of the respective regimes for sea 
carriage, there appears to be enough support for the favourability of the Hamburg 
Rules at sea. This would not discard the wealth of case law built up under the 
Hague Visby Rules as the principles from specific scenarios can be considered 
within the flexible application of the Hamburg Rules. 
 
Comparing the limits of liability 
 
The second consideration is whether it is possible to set a uniform monetary limit 
on liability for each mode of transport or whether the risks in the different modes 
justify different monetary limits of liability for each mode. 
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Tha Hague Rules has few provisions for compensation of loss or damage to 
goods. If the sea carrier is found to be liable for loss, his liability is limited to £100 
per package or unit, referred to as an unbreakable limit213, unless a declaration 
has been entered on the bill of lading by the shipper in which case the carrier will 
be liable for the declared amount.214
 
The Hague-Visby Rules are more comprehensive than the Hague Rules, they 
provide that the amount of damages are to be determined by the value of the 
goods at the port of discharge.215 Monetary limits are set at 666.67 SDR per 
package or unit or 2 SDR per kilogram, whichever is the higher.  This limit can be 
broken if there was an act or omission by the sea carrier, done with intent to 
cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably 
result.216
 
The Hamburg Rules have a higher limit of liability; 835 SDR per package, or 
other shipping unit, or 2.5 SDR per kilogram of gross weight whichever is the 
higher.217 These limits can, similar to the Hague-Visby Rules, be broken if there 
was an act or omission by the sea carrier, done with intent to cause damage, or 
recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.218
 
Under the CMR a carriers liability for loss of goods is limited to 8.33 SDR’s per 
kilogram219, this limit may be broken by agreement between the parties.220 The 
carrier will also lose his right to limit if the loss was caused by willful misconduct 
of the carrier. 
                                                 
213 De Wit, R Multimodal Transport 88. 
214 Ibid  83. 
215 Article IV, section 5. 
216 Article IV, section 5. 
217 Article 6 and 26 Hamburg Rules. 
218 Article 8, section 1, Hamburg Rules. 
219 Article 23, section 3, CMR. 
220 Article 24 CMR. 
 73
The COTIF/CIM mirrors the rules and procedures of the CMR in determining 
liability limits, although the actual limitation is higher, set at 17 SDR per 
kilogram.221
 
The Montreal Convention limits compensation to 17 SDR per kilogram. Under the 
Warsaw Convention the air carriers liability is limited to £14 per Kilogram.222 This 
limit may be broken if the carrier or his servants and agents have acted with the 
intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would 
result.223
 
There is, therefore, greater disharmony when comparing the monetary limits of 
each regime to each other than when comparing the liability tests of each regime. 
I would submit that the influences on the former are far more technical and varied 
than the influences on the latter. Factors influencing liability limits include; 
insurance companies, marketing reasons, perceived risks and policy.   
 
Liability limits in the Montreal Convention have recently been increased because 
of marketing pressures. They were previously perceived to be too low224 and 
were increased when carriers were advised by insurers that higher limits could be 
insured at reasonable cost.225 Conversely, the situation is different on the road, a 
2001 report concluded that for intra-EU transportation there was seldom any 
incentive to litigate the liability limit because the average cargo value of goods 
transported by road was quite low.226
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The premiums set by insurers, which have an influence on setting limits of 
liability, are determined on a very mathematical basis and a wide range of factors 
are considered including the perceived risks of the mode of transport. Although I 
have argued that perceived risks, if any, should not have a place in determining 
the system of liability to be applied, it is quite understandable that they would be 
considered for premium calculation purposes. The general value of goods 
transported by road, air, rail or sea would also be considered when calculating 
premiums. It is, therefore, hard to imagine how a uniform limit could be calculated 
independently for each mode of transport.  
 
It has been argued that it would, in any event, be inappropriate to impose uniform 
limits because individual states or groups of states should be free to vary the 
limits for reasons of policy to, for example, encourage the carriage of goods by 
rail rather than road and thus influence their economies.227
 
It would seem that the answer to whether it is possible to set a uniform monetary 
limit on liability for each mode of transport is more problematical than unifying the 
differing liability tests because of the wide range of influential factors. It is no 




I have argued that, provided a liability regime is agreed for sea carriage and 
provided the Warsaw System does not adopt a strict liability approach for 
damage, a single liability test could be adopted for the differing modes of 
carriage. I have also argued that it will be difficult to agree a single monetary limit 
for liability. 
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I would, therefore, suggest that the closest drafters can get to a uniform system is 
one that allows a deviation from the uniform system for differing liability monetary 
limits of liability, depending on the mode during which damage occurs.  
 
Perhaps proposed limits could be inserted in a uniform convention and parties 
could be given the choice to insert their own to override the set limits. Certain 
minimums could also be set for each leg to ensure that the system is not abused. 
The problem one spots straight away though, is that we are faced with a return to 
devising a set of rules where the localisation of damage cannot be determined. At 
least drafters can concentrate their efforts on trying to solve this problem. 
 
As the only deviation from a pure uniform system would be provisions relating to 
liability limits, such a convention would be sufficiently based on the uniform 
system to allow the principle of "transferring risk from cargo interests to 
multimodal transport operators" to take place under a single transport contract. 
The risks of determining what limits would apply when the locality of damage 
cannot be confirmed would, therefore, rest the with the multimodal transport 
operator. 
 
I would submit that this is the goal that drafters should set their sights on as such 
a set of rules would, if widely adopted, go a long way to reducing the 
unpredictability borne by multimodal transport operators and would be healthy for 
the industry in long run. 
 
Conclusion 
I believe that the most important point discussed above was the requirement for a 
"compelling need" to be present before a convention is attempted. It appears that 
this need was not strong enough when the Multimodal Convention and the Draft 
Instrument were drafted, leading to their failure. 
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What this highlights is that the multimodal transport industry is ultimately 
responsible for the possible success of a multimodal convention and will have to 
rally to the cause. Once this “compelling need” is established it can hopefully also 
bring momentum to a uniform regime for sea carriage being adopted, which is an 
important step to uniformity. Drafters will then be able to plan a new convention 
drawing on the lessons taught by the failings and successes of the Multimodal 
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